If the oligopolists pursued their own interests individually, they would then produce a total greater than the monopoly quantity, and would demand a price below the monopoly price, thus making a lesser profit. The promise of greater gains encourages oligopolies to cooperate. However, the oasis of collusion is inherently unstable, as the most efficient companies will be tempted to break ranks by reducing prices in order to increase their market share. The Dutch cases of this study have an average duration of about five years, which is comparable to the typical duration of the agreements (Levenstein and Suslow 2006, 2011). This period shows that companies are able to stabilize their cartels for several years, reflecting a form of stability and effective coordination. In addition to duration, most cases involve a large number of participating companies. Thus, in the cases, 7 and 9 15 companies were involved. It draws attention to the need for communication and surveillance systems in coordinating collective actions in cartels. Empirical studies of cartels, using a social approach, criticize economic assumptions about behaviour as too simple (Parker 2012). The results of the draft Melbourne AgreementNote 6 show the discrepancies between the economic assumptions of competition policy and the social reality of business conduct (Parker 2012).

Haines and Beaton-Wells 2012). A social approach studies the relationship between the plates of reflection instead of focusing on the individual agent. It considers that the actions of the individual are strongly socially entrenched. A social approach takes into account agreements in the context of mutual trust, emphasizing the incentives of companies to cooperate in the informal definition of agreements. Confidence can be an important part of explaining how companies are able to operate their agreements over a long period of time (Stephan 2010); Leslie 2004) and better responsible for some of the recent empirical discoveries on the stability of agreements. As part of the implementation of the agreements, companies will rely on reciprocal rights and obligations as a result of the coordination of agreements and their compensation (Van de Bunt 2010; Hertogh 2005). This allows for the development of general reciprocity within the agreement. Debt to others and other debts has an impact on the stock. This is expected to create interdependence between companies, which in turn will encourage peaceful arbitration and prevent fraud, thereby stabilizing the cartel. “It was a statement from the legal auditor who stated how many square metres [Name Company] had delivered the previous year. We would manipulate that statement and present it at the meeting. We scrambled the [type of product] that was not relevant to the agreement.

We would leave the total amount, but we would replace the foreclosures with the money we had previously reported. (1) These four cases show that despite sophisticated coordination systems, fraud can lead to conflict.